The Matter of Truth, the Matter of Matter: Which Matters More? Part III

I won’t be messing around any further talking about people, subjects, perceptions, or points of view, or ideologies.

I’m going to move forward to get to the good and grand stuff: I am going to conceive of everything as a world. As a world which is worlding. A flower, a bug, a Republican, a Nazi, a mote of dust, a text – these are not objects or subjects- these are each worlds and what they are each doing is worlding.

Worlds worlding.

They are worlding along.

All of these worlds do not somehow occupy a common world, which world would be the world we commonly refer to as ‘the world.’ Nor do these infinite worlds form a collectivity which we would commonly call ‘the universe.’

These worlds do not have something between all of them which is the same, which something we would call ‘universal.’

These worlds are different.

It might be that there are elements in common in some very large subset of these worlds. For example, it might be that one would find objects called ‘dogs’ in an enormous number of these worlds, if one were to compare the contents of worlds. One might find the content ‘dog’ in every world one examined.

Common elements wouldn’t make worlds the same. Each world has some difference from other worlds. Any difference between worlds would make worlds be completely different.

How so?

Um, er, ah…. Can I use Leibniz here? Indiscernability of the identical? If it isn’t different, it is identical? If it isn’t different, it is not another world one is seeing? You wouldn’t discern it as another world if it wasn’t different. Or have I drifted into circularity here? ( Or misunderstanding?)