Saturday, January 10, 2009

The Totalization of Shadows, Part X

I am primarily interested in the process of a reactivation of a philosophical ethos, and am trying to learn how such a reactivation happens--bypassing the mystifications of reactivation understood metaphorically or subjectively, psychologically.

This primary interest is not entirely irrelevant to the Enlightenment theme of the blog: my favorite way of viewing the historical Enlightenment is to think of this period as one of a reactivation of philosophical ethos. The period can be viewed this way without being blind to any of the imperfections and failings of the period's philosophers or their projects.

I also think that our blog exploration of the theme of Totalization and the overcoming of Totalization is consonant with finding out how a reactivation of a philosophical ethos might happen. Reactivation could be an overcoming of Totalization, (but how?)

I am mentioning what my primary interest is because I doubt it would be obvious to anyone looking at the various approaches I have been playing with, which might not even seem to have anything in common.

For example, the hominids interested me because the hominids had to have reactivated a philosophical ethos—I do mean to say reactivated and I do mean to say philosophical—the philosophical ethos is not cultural, or humanly, or subjective. I think hominids were philosophers in exactly the same way children are, through a raw confrontation of reality.

Children devise ways of ending this raw confrontation with reality as quickly as possible-- reality is not pleasant or fun to confront—-that this is so has a great deal to do with what I want to say about reactivation. Also, I find that the theme we haven't touched in a long time, the one about "desiring of ones' own repression"-- and why we would so commonly observe the deactivation of philosophical ethos, meet up in the horror of this raw confrontation.

4 Comments:

Anonymous Anonymous said...

Hi Yusef,

Good to hear from you again. You raise an interesting avenue of thought in trying to understand an "reactivation of a philosophical ethos" as seemed to occur during The Enlightenment.

But to move forward I think we need a more precise definition of the concept.

Do you use the term "philosophical ethos" in the original Greek sense of "disposition", "moral character" or simply as attempts to create a Weltanschauung", meaning coming to grips with the inexplicable or mysterious - in other words: Reality.

Or are you referring to systematic philosophical inquiries in an academic sense (Kant)?

It seems, from your references to hominids and children, that you are talking about an impressionistic, yet hermeneutic approach to the world around us.

About the "reactivation" part: Are you suggesting a primordial state or sense that emerges at intervals? Maybe in the Nietzschean concept of "the eternal return" (which we have previously discussed and fruitfully "answered")?

I look forward to your elaborations on this. Your post is certainly promising although also a bit unclear when you also state that "the philosophical ethos is not cultural, or humanly, or subjective."

All the best,

Orla

2:15 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

"Do you use the term "philosophical ethos" in the original Greek sense of "disposition", "moral character" or simply as attempts to create a Weltanschauung", meaning coming to grips with the inexplicable or mysterious - in other words: Reality."

I think the philosophical ethos is a willingness to confront what we find fearful (which really may be dangerous,overpowering,terrible.)

Confrontation in philosophy would mean thinking about anything in any way, with none of the avenues of thinking closed off in advance of the thinking.

In other words, the philosophical ethos is an audacity to think-- which, when put that way, brings us right back to the historical Enlightenment, where this audacity to think was reawakened (as our frontispiece continues to remind us.)

I don't think this audacity is cultural--I don't think it is an attitude, moral character, disposition, or "human." I may be contradicting myself here, as I spoke just above of a "willingness to confront," which seems to indicate both a disposition and a subjectivity. I don't know what to make of that.

--Yusef

4:23 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

"But to move forward I think we need a more precise definition of the concept."

As you know, I have tended to resist this suggestion.

What I want to know is the answer to the "how" question: how does one achieve audacity to think? How does one have or get the audacity to think for oneself?

And what I would also like to know is,in order to answer the "how" question, to what extent do I need precise definitions of philosophical ethos and reactivation; to what extent does having these precise definitions end or close off the inquiry?

(If I have what I consider a precise definition of these terms, what more do I need to know? I hate the situation where I have some precise knowledge but it gets me nowhwere--I can't really do anything with it.)

I am making and using assumptions about the meanings of my terms which I am more or less silent about. For example, I am reasoning that moral character in philosophizing and a philosophical ethos are incompatible.

If moral character in philosophizing meant there would be some conclusions which had to be rejected on the basis of their immorality, or meant that some ways of thinking were or could be immoral in themselves and this could be prejudged, then moral character in philosophizing is incompatible with philosophical ethos understood as an audacity to think anything in any way.

--Yusef

4:50 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Thanks for your comments, Yusef.

Your write, I think the philosophical ethos is a willingness to confront what we find fearful (which really may be dangerous,overpowering,terrible.)

If we substitute "willingness" with "need" we avoid the problematic subject.

Indeed, an audacity to think is to confront chaos. And what would thinking be if it did not constantly face chaos.

Concept creation (philosophizing) is consequently a chaoid state par excellence - it refers back to a chaos rendered consistent, become Thought, mental chaosmos (Deleuze).

There's a beautiful German adjective fragenwürdig which means a statement 'worthy of questions'. And that's what philosophy and thinking should always be about.

But as you suggest the question ought to be "how" instead of "why".

The problem is that causality holds an irresistible seduction and sense of relief: Oh, THAT'S the way it is. Closure. Instead we should ask: In what other ways might this be the reason?

Causality is a prison and language a straitjacket. How do we break free from grammar?

"How" means not even a method. It is intellectual or rather practical instincts, random reactions, unpredictable (although often effective) mental behavior. Above all it is specific and individual.

And traditional philosophy is generalizing.

So, how do you create dialog and "fragenwürige" observations?

Orla
















You are totally right that moral character in philosophizing and a philosophical ethos are incompatible. This is the core of Nietzsche's philosophy.

Your resistance to definitions is welcomed.

6:51 PM  

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