The Shadows of Totalization, Part IX

I want to look very briefly at Orla’s comment,

“Isn’t this exactly what thinking should be: A Disturbance? Of conventionally used images. The Dynamics of Creative Interruption.

Or to continue this hypertext of texts (or waves creating waves) with a Deleuzian quote, 'The logic of a thinking is like a wind that pushes us in our backs, a series of gusts and tremors. As Leibniz says, you think you have safely arrived in harbor, but discovers that you are still on the open seas'.

And isn’t this what open, generous blogging should be: Tender gusts, irritating head winds, warm breezes, deadly twisters, and inviting waves? Curves instead of angles.”-from Valentine's Day 2009.

Thinking, Orla says, should be a disturbance of conventionally used images.

Let’s assume this is true. Assuming its truth, what is required for us to think is to, 1) determine which images are conventionally used; 2) determine what the conventional use of these images consists of; 3) determine what the disturbance of conventionally used images consists of.

With regard to 1): is there any reason to restrict the inquiry to “images”? Is there a reason to restrict the inquiry to “use”?

With regard to 2): I think it is necessary to differentiate between levels and spheres of conventional use—in politics, business, social life, art, architecture, or any other part of life. I think some of the interest would be in how the conventional use of the same image varies or stays the same over different regions (for example, the image of the father—why the father image appears at all in the political sphere conceived as a sphere of rationality.)

With regard to 3): Which is disturbance? There is a conventionally used image of what a disturbance is…In other words, there are preconceived notions of what disturbs or does not. Left “undisturbed” these preconceived notions disturb disturbance. This points to the somewhat counter-intuitive notion that there is nothing primitive or simple about disturbance—whatever it is, it isn’t itself an act of thoughtlessness, something which can be accomplished without thoughtful effort. It can’t be accomplished as reaction, as temper tantrum. What seems counter-intuitive to me is that disturbance must involve something like delicacy. As both Orla and Deleuze rely, above, on conventional use of imagery (there’s nothing unconventional about using wind-imagery to evoke mind, spirit) the disturbance of conventionally-used images involves some conventional use of imagery—a delicate use.