Amok in a Muck: The Geology of Repression, Part IV
Maggot: “I want to speak very briefly to you, Father Gilliam,” said Maggot, “about my purposes in all of this. I wanted to pick up on and develop these questions posed earlier this year by Dr. Spinoza…”
Father Gilliam: "Which questions are those, Maggot?"
Maggot: "These ones, Father Gilliam--"
Dr. Spinoza: “Thursday, March 02, 2006
An Announcement
What I want to do here is start thinking much more carefully and responsibly about what it is that I'm doing when I say of someone that he is desiring his own oppression.”
I Want My MTV . . .
The critical-theoretic question is: why do people desire their own oppression?
How do we show people that what they desire is oppressing them? Can this be shown? What epistemic perspective is presupposed in the very move of saying this to someone -- isn't it tantamount to saying, "I know you better than you know yourself." How is that possible? What are the implications of this for the problems of first-person authority?
In order to make good on this sort of claim, would critical theory have to be scientific? What sort of science would it be? Could there even be a science of human happiness, of flourishing, and of autonomy?
All of the problems that Adorno raised as he attempted to situate himself against both Heidegger on the one hand and against Popper on the other remain problems for any critical theory worth the name.”
Maggot: “To be very brief in describing my intentions ( and brief in order to be crystal clear and unmistakable in what I desire to do ) I believe that the only way to be careful and responsible about what it is that we’re doing when we say of someone that he is desiring his own repression is to utilize a ‘geology of morals’ approach such as the one you are offering, Father Gilliam.”
"We can only start to think much more carefully and responsibly about what it is that we are doing when we say of someone that he is desiring his own oppression if there is such a thing as a thinking on anything at all which is not moored and mired in doxa ( opinion ) and psychologisms…." Father Gilliam interjected.
Maggot: “ I am guessing that your utilization of Hjelmslevian linguistics, which you applaud on the basis of this linguistics having escaped or dismantled the logic of the signified-signifier is the way that you believe you are now able to think about morals ( and repression ) in a way which is not moored and mired in doxa (opinion) and psychologism.”
Father Gilliam: "Yes, that’s right Maggot. I believe that I can think carefully and responsibly about what it is that I am doing when I say of someone that he is desiring his own oppression – and my move has no recourse to set theory per se, ( and this is going to put me at odds with many American philosophers – who seem to think that the only way to responsibly think is with set theory) – but really has everything to do with a much more complex theory of linguistics, where words and things , mots et choses, are in “disorder” at least insofar as our sense of “order” is hideously entwined and enmangled by our imagined role of the signifier-signified."
Maggot: “Well, that’s got to be coming as a relief to Dr. Spinoza – that set theory stuff really scares him, and if I have come to the right conclusion after observing his behavior – seems to be in the background of a terrible guilty conscience he has about his thinking, and his interests in thinking being indelibly committed to the irresponsible and ultimately frivolous.. Yeah, as if anything but set theoretical thinking were mere humpty-dumpty pompous opinionation.”
Father Gilliam: "Which questions are those, Maggot?"
Maggot: "These ones, Father Gilliam--"
Dr. Spinoza: “Thursday, March 02, 2006
An Announcement
What I want to do here is start thinking much more carefully and responsibly about what it is that I'm doing when I say of someone that he is desiring his own oppression.”
I Want My MTV . . .
The critical-theoretic question is: why do people desire their own oppression?
How do we show people that what they desire is oppressing them? Can this be shown? What epistemic perspective is presupposed in the very move of saying this to someone -- isn't it tantamount to saying, "I know you better than you know yourself." How is that possible? What are the implications of this for the problems of first-person authority?
In order to make good on this sort of claim, would critical theory have to be scientific? What sort of science would it be? Could there even be a science of human happiness, of flourishing, and of autonomy?
All of the problems that Adorno raised as he attempted to situate himself against both Heidegger on the one hand and against Popper on the other remain problems for any critical theory worth the name.”
Maggot: “To be very brief in describing my intentions ( and brief in order to be crystal clear and unmistakable in what I desire to do ) I believe that the only way to be careful and responsible about what it is that we’re doing when we say of someone that he is desiring his own repression is to utilize a ‘geology of morals’ approach such as the one you are offering, Father Gilliam.”
"We can only start to think much more carefully and responsibly about what it is that we are doing when we say of someone that he is desiring his own oppression if there is such a thing as a thinking on anything at all which is not moored and mired in doxa ( opinion ) and psychologisms…." Father Gilliam interjected.
Maggot: “ I am guessing that your utilization of Hjelmslevian linguistics, which you applaud on the basis of this linguistics having escaped or dismantled the logic of the signified-signifier is the way that you believe you are now able to think about morals ( and repression ) in a way which is not moored and mired in doxa (opinion) and psychologism.”
Father Gilliam: "Yes, that’s right Maggot. I believe that I can think carefully and responsibly about what it is that I am doing when I say of someone that he is desiring his own oppression – and my move has no recourse to set theory per se, ( and this is going to put me at odds with many American philosophers – who seem to think that the only way to responsibly think is with set theory) – but really has everything to do with a much more complex theory of linguistics, where words and things , mots et choses, are in “disorder” at least insofar as our sense of “order” is hideously entwined and enmangled by our imagined role of the signifier-signified."
Maggot: “Well, that’s got to be coming as a relief to Dr. Spinoza – that set theory stuff really scares him, and if I have come to the right conclusion after observing his behavior – seems to be in the background of a terrible guilty conscience he has about his thinking, and his interests in thinking being indelibly committed to the irresponsible and ultimately frivolous.. Yeah, as if anything but set theoretical thinking were mere humpty-dumpty pompous opinionation.”
posted by Yusef Asabiyah at 1:03 PM
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