Irruption from Totalization
I state my problem as being to determine a non-metaphorical way of achieving a reactivation of a philosophical ethos. Alternatively, I could say my intention is to determine the material conditions of this reactivation.
In Orla’s last post, it appeared to me at first as if what I call a metaphorical or idealistic reactivation is what he calls an “image of thought.” I also previously thought when Orla spoke of the “image of thought” he meant it derisively, as something which must be overcome, discarded, or somehow otherwise negated. I think I have some textual support for this interpretation of Orla, for example in his posts on Noology or “Thought without Image”. Isn’t reasonable to conclude a proponent of a Noology, understood as thought without image, is in favor of somehow or other getting rid of image (image of thought)?
Therefore, I took some of what Orla said in his last post as a continuing recommendation to me that if I wished to accomplish what I want to accomplish, I need to cast off the image of thought.
I have assumed Orla takes Deleuze and Guattari to have discovered a way to succeed over an image of thought, but is this correct? Is this what Deleuze and Guattari hoped to achieve? (Or did achieve?)
Rather than going back over Deleuze and Guattari to answer this question, I am merely going to take a look at two quotes Orla has recently used to support his ideas.
First, look at this,
We head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return with bloodshot eyes. We’ve seen something—an image? I think we have seen an image, although it must be an image which is in excess of what our eyes could have visualized or accommodated prior to our heading for the horizon. I admit this is a strange kind of image…However I protest saying what happened to us and our eyes on the horizon is without image—if without image, it was unnecessary and misleading for Deleuze and Guattari to have invoked eyes, especially to have invoked “eyes of the mind.”
Secondly, this quote,
Note here that Deleuze and Guattari not only retain the image of thought, they are bold enough to tell us how it is constituted. I don’t see any evidence they do this to ridicule or degrade the notion of an image of thought.
Deleuze and Guattari are discovered to not reject, eliminate, eradicate, or negate the image of thought. They seek to take it to the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and somehow rupture it, change it.(The question of how this is done remains relevant.) I do not think I need to reject or eliminate the image of thought in order to determine the material conditions for the reactivation of a philosophical ethos--I need to find out (if I am following DG, but I follow DG by forgetting about them most of the time) how to the rupture the image of thought.
In Orla’s last post, it appeared to me at first as if what I call a metaphorical or idealistic reactivation is what he calls an “image of thought.” I also previously thought when Orla spoke of the “image of thought” he meant it derisively, as something which must be overcome, discarded, or somehow otherwise negated. I think I have some textual support for this interpretation of Orla, for example in his posts on Noology or “Thought without Image”. Isn’t reasonable to conclude a proponent of a Noology, understood as thought without image, is in favor of somehow or other getting rid of image (image of thought)?
Therefore, I took some of what Orla said in his last post as a continuing recommendation to me that if I wished to accomplish what I want to accomplish, I need to cast off the image of thought.
I have assumed Orla takes Deleuze and Guattari to have discovered a way to succeed over an image of thought, but is this correct? Is this what Deleuze and Guattari hoped to achieve? (Or did achieve?)
Rather than going back over Deleuze and Guattari to answer this question, I am merely going to take a look at two quotes Orla has recently used to support his ideas.
First, look at this,
“Precisely because the plane of immanence is prephilosophical and does not immediately take effect with concepts, it implies a sort of groping experimentation and its layout resorts to measures that are not very respectable, rational, or reasonable. These measures belong to the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness and excess. We head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the mind.” D&G, What is Philosophy, page 41, quoted by Orla on September 7, 2008.
We head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return with bloodshot eyes. We’ve seen something—an image? I think we have seen an image, although it must be an image which is in excess of what our eyes could have visualized or accommodated prior to our heading for the horizon. I admit this is a strange kind of image…However I protest saying what happened to us and our eyes on the horizon is without image—if without image, it was unnecessary and misleading for Deleuze and Guattari to have invoked eyes, especially to have invoked “eyes of the mind.”
Secondly, this quote,
Thought demands “only” movement that can be carried to infinity. What thought claims by right, what it selects, is infinite movement or the movement of the infinite. It is this that constitutes the image of thought. D&G: What Is Philosophy?, p. 37, quoted by Orla on January 25, 2009.
Note here that Deleuze and Guattari not only retain the image of thought, they are bold enough to tell us how it is constituted. I don’t see any evidence they do this to ridicule or degrade the notion of an image of thought.
Deleuze and Guattari are discovered to not reject, eliminate, eradicate, or negate the image of thought. They seek to take it to the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and somehow rupture it, change it.(The question of how this is done remains relevant.) I do not think I need to reject or eliminate the image of thought in order to determine the material conditions for the reactivation of a philosophical ethos--I need to find out (if I am following DG, but I follow DG by forgetting about them most of the time) how to the rupture the image of thought.
posted by Yusef Asabiyah at 5:33 PM
2 Comments:
Thanks so much for your thoughtful comments, Yusef.
I'm too drunk/exhausted/sleepy to respond in the same vein now, but will do so in the coming days.
One thing though: When you write "I follow DG by forgetting about them most of the time" I find myself doing the same thing, although it is very hard!
I was reading Wittgenstein today and came across his observation,
"When I'm thinking about something, without wanting to write a book, then I jump around in the themes: It's the only way to think that comes natural to me. To be forced to think along in a series of fixed succession is a pain to me. Should I even try to do so?
I WASTE so much effort trying to organize my thoughts, maybe without it having any value at all."
And NO: We don't need an IMAGE of thought - but yet: it is THERE in the collective, culturally determined, consciousness. Escaping it is so damned difficult. I think this is what D&G were desperately trying to avoid.
Which leads me to the question whether thinking (philosophically - or reactivating a philosophical ethos) isn't (or should be) totally anarchistic and iconoclastic - if it be worthy of the name of real thinking?
You are a revolutionary spirit, Yusef. I struggle to become one.
Orla
"When I'm thinking about something, without wanting to write a book, then I jump around in the themes: It's the only way to think that comes natural to me. To be forced to think along in a series of fixed succession is a pain to me. Should I even try to do so?"
Aha!
A Wittgensteinian gold-tinged fog.
What's more, he's asking exactly the same questions I am asking.
Great minds think alike!
-Yusef
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