The Penumbra of the Empty, Part VIII
I can acknowledge-recognize the heuristic-epistemological value of the dividing practices.
I can acknowledge-recognize we need to simplify to:
1. “Conquer problems…”
2. “Be triumphant against that which nags us…”
If we separate “it” into its “component parts” we can take care of “it.”
(Take care of “it” can mean: manage “it”, nurture “it”, educate “it”, embed “it”, help “it” emerge, be open to “it”.)
Kant has seized upon this heuristic-epistemological value of the dividing practices but Marx is more hesitant. Marx does, however, find he cannot avoid the utility of the dividing practices.
I can acknowledge-recognize we need to simplify to:
1. “Conquer problems…”
2. “Be triumphant against that which nags us…”
If we separate “it” into its “component parts” we can take care of “it.”
(Take care of “it” can mean: manage “it”, nurture “it”, educate “it”, embed “it”, help “it” emerge, be open to “it”.)
Kant has seized upon this heuristic-epistemological value of the dividing practices but Marx is more hesitant. Marx does, however, find he cannot avoid the utility of the dividing practices.
posted by Yusef Asabiyah at 2:00 PM
3 Comments:
I sense a strong self-contradictory force at work here, what you repeat again and again in different words, has little to do with heuristic-epistemology. In epistemology we break down things to smaller parts to understand them better. To know their constituents. What you describe is an substantial "it" that we can handle in different ways, but every term you mention has nothing to do with knowing, the exception is 'educate'. There is also a strong contradiction that could have its root in subject-object dualism, when you mention that we can, at the same time, embed it and be open to it. I am sorry I cant add something positive.
I'm not sure I agree...I think maybe what you are pointing to as a contradiction relates to the essence of what I am trying to say. The dividing practices are in a way justified through their "epistemological-heuristic" usefulness--look at how fundamental they are to Kant in the Critique of Practical Reason. (He doesn't call them dividing practices, of course.) Kant does not however think of them in terms of their political power--precisely what Marx highlights. By my interpretation of it, Marx discovers he can't do away with this political power because he can't do away with its epistemological utility. Marx does not arrive at a conception of power/knowledge...This is a different conception than Marx's ideology, as I was saying to you before. My goal isn't to slyly evoke power/knowledge. We as heirs to the Enlightenment do live in a world where due to their explosive productive powers the dividing practices pervade virtually every aspect of our lives and are embedded in our muscles and nerves. They are anything but merely epistemological. We do not yet have a sophisticated enough view of power/knowledge to cope with this unintended consequence.
-Yusef
When I enlarged upon what "to take care of" could mean by listing some synonyms, my intention was only to make "to take care of" be as broad and imprecise as possible.
I think you may be right about my listing of openness here as leading to a contradiction with some of the other terms...The contradiction is relevant to the overall discussion of totalization. I think it is probably also true that openness doesn't have anything to do with knowledge as knowledge was understood before the 20th century--but why that would be, and to be more specific about what openness could mean in this regard, and in terms of a reactivation of a philosophical ethos, is where I want to go.
--Yusef
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