Umbrellas Unopent in Tempests, Part XXIII

If “openness” is understood (the meaning of “openness” tacitly held by Itwethey and Itwethey assumes many others) within a network of metaphors of structure; and if structure is to be understood as time-invariant; but if the many other people (and Itwethey, too, until some point in time) think of “openness” as time-space-variable and varying (which is to say they don’t necessarily take their own metaphors very seriously, which might also be to say their approach to their own “openness” is open?) The inconsistency of their approach to their own metaphors is more than made up by their consistency in keeping “OPEN”, if open such it be.

Itwethey, however, faces a problem here. Remember, Itwethey wishes to explicate “openness” in a way which would continue, throughout the explication, to be acceptable and recognizable to the acolytes and apostles of “openness” (the many other people who share Itwethey’s vague understanding of “openness.”) Itwethey must choose to take the metaphors seriously, or the intentions of the metaphors seriously, or find a way to take both seriously at the same time (on the surface, the last seems impossible.)

For a long time, Itwethey had bluntly rejected “openness” and its apostles and acolytes precisely when they announced to Itwethey their willingness to not care about any concern outside of their intentions of “openness.” Itwethey saw “openness” as a kind of magic fudge factor allowing for and justifying all rule breaking or inconsistency (“flexibility” understood as ad hoc convenient justifications for not doing the right thing X, where X = anything on any level, but usually a mental act, for reasons to which Itwethey must return.)

Itwethey’s putative discovery of “openness” as time-invariant isn’t useful in explicating “openness” or finding an opening into the acolytes and apostles of “openness” if each time the consequence of “openness” as time-invariant is deemed inconvenient, annoying, or simply unopen (closed.) (This last is the most damning summary judgment of these acolytes and apostles.) There is no way Itwethey knows to show the acolytes and apostles that if the consequences are the true ones, the inconvenience perceived may be apparent merely. (However, that isn’t the real issue—convincing the acolytes and apostles. Itwethey has some real problem of Itwethey’s own in this vicinity, and it doesn’t have anything to do with convincing Itwetheyself, or being true to Itwetheyself.)