The Shadows of Totalization, Part XXVI
Among the difficulties to be surmounted is to convince oneself objectivity is a concept. Under most circumstances, I find it much more pleasant to treat objectivity tautologically: objectivity is objective. I think: somewhere, somehow-–buried deep within me-- or is it at the limit of the universe?—there is objectivity, I only need reach it. (Strangely, I do not trouble myself with the problem of whether I will know it when I've reached it.)
Objectivity is objective—not conceptual. One thinks. One can even be aware of the history of objectivity and believe this to be true—because history (even evolutionary history) can be viewed as progress towards objectivity, towards the reaching of the objective. Objectivity is out there and we as a people or a species are on our way to there. We realize ourselves as a people and species when we reach objectivity; we betray ourselves as a people (and as species?) when we turn from it.
We can and have viewed the historical Enlightenment in precisely this way: as a very important step on our species’ journey towards a realization of the objective. I think we’ve confused ourselves by doing this, however, because such a view of the historical Enlightenment is not entirely coeval with our view of the Enlightenment as the overcoming of Totalization, the reactivation of a philosophical ethos.
The one strand of the concept of objectivity which I can at present grab onto (in the hope I can make the rest of the ball of yarn unwind) is the strand of the objective as the publicly accessible. There is a terrible, fantastic, and debilitating interweaving of this notion with the previously-mentioned one of the Enlightenment as progress towards a realization of the objective: Enlightenment as progress towards publicity.